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Abstract 
In our 1998 volume ‘The Politics of Chemical Risk: Scenarios for a regulatory Future’ 
we envisioned four ideal typical scenarios for the future of European chemicals policies. 
The scenarios focused on the nature of expertise (seen either as a universal or a localised 
phenomenon) and the organisation of the boundary between science and policy (as either 
diverging or converging). The four scenarios were titled International Experts, European 
Risk Consultation, European Coordination of Assessment, and Europe as a Translator. 
For all four scenarios, we hypothesized internal dynamics and articulated dilemmas related 
to the development of the sciences contributing to chemical assessment, the relation 
between the EU and member states and the role of the public. 
 In this contribution, we look back on our four scenarios fifteen years later, to see 
which ones have materialized and to explore whether the dilemmas we saw have indeed 
surfaced. We conclude that the International Experts scenario by and large has materialized 
and explore some of the underlying tensions and dynamics in this development. 
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1 Regulatory futures 
 
In the winter of 1995 we gathered thirty experts in an Amsterdam hotel to get to the 
bottom of the fundamental misunderstandings over chemical risk regulation. Half of the 
experts were natural scientists working on chemical risk issues: toxicologists, regulatory 
risk assessors, experts from regulatory agencies. The other half were social scientists who 
had been studying regulatory decision making, trying to analyse the frames and 
assumptions underlying regulation, and in some cases even challenging those 
assumptions, academically or in activism. 
 We were young and our plan was ambitious. Both of us were doing PhD research 
on the organisation of the science/policy boundary in chemical licensing and standard 
setting, either in occupational health (Bal, 1999), or environmental hazards of chemicals 
(Halffman, 2003). We imagined that, in the absence of concrete economic stakes or 
disagreement over specific substances, we could at least have a meaningful debate about 
the paradigm of risk assessment, the boundary between science and policy in regulatory 
regimes, and the world views underlying them. We had also hoped to consider some 
alternative ideas to organise regulatory regimes. To focus the debate, we aimed at the 
construction of four scenarios for the future organisation of regulatory chemical hazard 
assessment. The scenarios focused on the nature of expertise (seen either as universal or 
imbued with local context, such a national regulatory traditions) and the organisation of 
the boundary between science and policy (as either sharp and diverging or flexible and 
converging). The results were published in a book, which included both the presentations 
and an account of the debates at the event (Bal & Halffman, 1998). 
 We now write almost a decade and a half later. New issues have appeared on the 
regulatory agenda since: toxicity of nano-materials, the unravelling of BSE, chemical 
persistence, or endocrine disruption. Meanwhile also, the organisation of regulatory 
expertise has witnessed some important shifts, such as with the introduction of the REACH 
scheme and the creation of the European Chemicals Agency, as extensively documented in 
this book. When the invitation came from the editors of this volume to look back and 
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reflect on how far the regulatory debate has come since, we were keen to make use of the 
occasion, although our research interests had moved on since. 
 In this chapter, we will give an account of the issues at stake around regulatory 
expertise, as we encountered them in our Amsterdam discussions and how we saw possible 
futures at the time. Second, we want to compare our expectations to regulatory 
developments since, as reflected in this volume. Last, we will once again try to look 
forward and explore regulatory futures once again. 
2 The future, as it was 
At the Amsterdam workshop, we presented four scenarios, entitled International Experts, 
European Risk Consultation, European Coordination of Assessment, and Europe as a 
Translator. For all four scenarios, we hypothesized internal dynamics and articulated 
dilemmas related to the development of the sciences contributing to chemical assessment, 
the relation between the EU and member states and the role of the public (Bal, 1998; 
Halffman & Bal, 1998). 
 The scenarios were based on what we saw as important tensions in regulatory 
regimes. First, we saw a tension between universalising risk assessment and a growing 
attention for local conditions of regulation. Risk assessment was clearly moving towards 
harmonisation, in Europe, but also beyond, as stated emphatically by the representatives 
of international initiatives. Regulatory experts insisted that they were making progress 
with shared standards for how to assess chemical hazards, so that companies would not 
have to repeat permit applications with slightly different testing requirements. 
 At the same time, there were indications of a counter-tendency, pointing out the 
need for political choice in chemical hazard assessment, particularly with respect to the 
definition of what needs to be protected (e.g. all biodiversity of a stream or merely 
interesting species and their ecological support). As the political assumptions at the basis 
of what seems technical risk assessments were being made explicit, it seemed like they 
would require rich political institutions to address. Similarly, different economic 
conditions could be conducive to a continued importance of national governments, 
leaving at best an intergovernmental logic for limited regulatory cooperation. 
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 The second tension we saw, was between those who defended a clear-cut 
demarcation of the work of experts and regulatory policy makers on the one hand, and 
those who questioned the wisdom of this insistence. This divide ran roughly along the 
split between natural scientists and social scientists, but the two did not coincide 
completely. 
 The argument for a strict maintenance of a science/policy boundary was complex. 
The regulatory scientists generally insisted on the importance of universalist principles of 
science and on standardised methodologies as guarantees for regulatory independence. 
Essentially, they argued, as many still do, that experts should be kept apart from politics 
to be able to do their job, taking understandable and admirable professional pride in their 
work. With such a separation, a rational process of risk assessment would be possible, 
while undesired intervention of superstition, emotion, political passion, or private interest 
could be kept at bay. 
The counter-argument form the social scientists (and science and technology studies 
in particular) were also varied. One was that private interest cannot be kept at bay by well 
intentioned principles, but that industry (to call it by its name) always manages to be 
present on the science-side of the divide more than other interests. Another argument was 
that the insistence on a strict separation based on standardised methods leads to the 
exclusion of un-standardised knowledge of adverse effects. (At the time endocrine 
disruption was becoming a major issue that was not covered in standard methods). In 
addition, a strategy to insist on a strict boundary would always face a challenge of 
hypocrisy, as risk assessment is unable to purify itself completely from all politics, all 
value-laden assumptions. Rather than to see a universal scientific method, social 
scientists pointed to the co-construction of methods by both scientists and regulatory 
agencies together, in fact at the very construction of entire fields of scientific expertise in 
the shadow of policy agencies such as the US Environmental Protection Agency or the 
OECD. 
The answer of regulatory experts to such issues is that they can show that nothing 
untoward is going on by being transparent about their work. Rather than to hide behind 
secretive deliberations that relied on personalised expertise, regulatory experts were 
begin to learn to document their evaluations. However, at the same time, governments 
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noticed that publishing an overwhelming amount of technical information can just as 
much create inaccessibility to regulatory assessments as a total lack of public information. 
An increasing transparency creates its own intransparancies. In addition, transparency 
only works if the premises of regulatory action are shared by all involved, which was 
exactly the problem. To use the example of endocrine disruption again: no amount of 
transparency could solve the problem that critics wanted this included as a relevant 
endpoint for testing, while regulatory experts could only point at the lack of standard 
methodology to assess such effects. Similarly, critics pointed out the chemical-by-
chemical assessment, ignoring the accumulated effect of chemicals already in circulation 
– a fundamental problem that continues to pose a serious challenge to all chemical 
regulation that considers exposure rates in assessments. 
As an alternative, we proposed to look at the relation between experts and non-
experts more symmetrically, for example by arguing that the principles by which experts 
(dis)trust each other are really not that different from the principles by which lay people 
(dis)trust experts. For example, experts rely on the reputation of other experts to assess 
whether a claim requires additional questioning, are more critical of a discrepant finding, 
or a finding that leads to higher costs, just as lay people do. With such arguments, we 
argued that more dialogical relations between processes of expertise and of value 
consideration were at least worth considering. 
 
In the scenario International Experts, we extrapolated the development of standards 
harmonised on a European level, organised around a strict boundary between science and 
politics. We saw this to imply the creation of a European chemical risk assessment 
agency, effectively internationalising expertise, fixing lingering differences in style and 
approach between EU countries. This is the scenario that most resembled the 
development of EU chemical regulation since. Even though, with hindsight, this may 
seem like a necessary development, at the time it was not. It seemed at least as likely that 
European chemical assessment would remain under national control, the European 
Coordination of Assessment scenario, so that countries maintained national resources to 
perform trusted assessments. Harmonization would then have gradually proceeded 
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through increased co-ordination of procedures, further protocolization, and increased 
expert cooperation. 
Our alternatives that suggested a more flexible attitude about the science/policy 
boundary seem further away from actual developments. In “Europe as a translator” we 
saw a regulatory role for Europe as a mediator between chemical regulation and debate as 
they were differently framed in various countries. In the last scenario, European risk 
consultation, expertise shifts to a European level, but provisions are made for controversy 
through consultation with national experts. Assessment is routinised where possible, but 
evaluation details are publicly available, allowing for a shift of assessment to more 
consultative procedures. 
On paper, it seems as if the “International Experts” scenario has become the reality. 
However, the tensions we identified in this scenario remain present. The key element of 
trying to maintain a strict boundary between risk assessment and risk management is that 
reason is mobilised to tame the beast of politics. The assumption is that we can define the 
rules of the reason game beforehand (test standards, assessment protocols, expert 
decision rules) and then hold all parties involved to these rules once the game is played. 
However, no game is played like that. Players contest the interpretation of the rules, the 
application of the rule to a particular case, whether a particular case is subject to the rules, 
will try to question the rules, change them, and – if all else fails – undermine them, 
sabotage implementation, or just refuse to play. For most players, the foundational rule 
that risk assessment must be separated from risk management can become just as 
questionable as the other rules. Even though chemical regulation driven by expert risk 
assessment may ‘fix’ risk regulation in principle, the question remains whether they also 
do in practice. 
3 New key tensions in chemical regulations: controversy 
The key test for REACH is not whether it will be able to assess thousands of chemicals. 
The real question is whether it will withstand escalated conflict over a handful of 
lucrative or strategically important chemicals. Risk assessment procedures in the past 
have been notoriously bad at anticipating and accommodating contestation. When we 
brought toxicologists and social scientists together at our meeting, the fiercest debates 
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(and the most fundamental misunderstandings) were about the framing of risk research 
problems, rather than excessive influence or malpractice in regulatory assessments. 
 Let us pay some extra attention to this point, for it is an extremely important one. 
Base regulatory contestation accuses regulators of inappropriate sympathies, intentional 
bias, or even outright corruption. The large majority of regulatory experts are of good 
faith and would equally condemn such practices. Most contestation of regulatory 
expertise is not of this base level. Rather, citizens ask questions such as: Are you sure that 
your findings also hold for children and pregnant women? Have you actually measured 
that in the soil, or is this a model? What will happen to this substance if it should escape 
from your laboratory (even if you claim it never will)? Such questions ask whether the 
risk assessments have been appropriately framed, whether an assessment protocol (by 
necessity a simplified representation of the world) covers all the relevant processes in the 
world, who has decided which processes should be considered relevant, and what kind of 
certainty is appropriate for action to be taken. The GMO debate offers a nice example: for 
the opponents the question is not just what GMOs will do in the soil or the human bowls, 
but also what they will do to the power relations between farmers and seed producers, an 
issue well beyond the expertise of your hard-working, honest, and sincere toxicologist. 
 Chemical risk assessment is a means to contain such conflicts. It defines a series 
of relevant endpoints and exposure processes in the world that we will accept as relevant, 
while others (such as changing property relations) are not. The boundary between risk 
assessment and risk regulation is not just a boundary that keeps dirty politics out of 
disinterested science, but also a boundary that prevents new concerns from making the 
assessment process unpredictable, for applicants, policy makers, as well as 
environmentalists. Such new concerns can be new health or environmental concerns, but 
also new arguments for mitigating factors or alleged over-estimation of risk. The 
alternatives to this strict boundary are basically propositions that try to find conditions for 
a reasonable debate about what should be considered relevant consequences. Chemical 
controversies are not just about whether the facts are right, but more interestingly also 
about whether these are the right facts. 
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 The question for REACH is whether it will be able to deal with these framing 
issues. In the next section we discuss some underlying tensions that question the ability 
of the REACH framework to do so in a sustainable way. 
4 New key tensions in chemical regulations: complexity 
Looking at the development of chemical regulation with the benefit of distance, some key 
developments can be identified. Most striking is the growing complexity of the regulatory 
regime. REACH involves more tests, testing more endpoints, and has more complex 
decision rules. For example, the extension of environmental effects from acute and 
chronic effects to persistence as a cause for concern shows how regulatory assessment is 
trying to include more of the complexity around chemicals interacting with the world. 
 However, this complexity is not just the result of a regulatory system that tries to 
mirror the complexity of the world out there. From a more political perspective, it also 
reflects the complexity of the negotiations around chemical regulation. Environmental 
concerns have insisted on new endpoints in the micro-politics of technical meetings and 
grass-root campaigning, such as with endocrine disruptors. Industrial organisations have 
argued for flexibility, regulatory restraint, or even de-regulation, such as with low volume 
chemicals. Different EU member states have argued the case for ‘their’ industries. The 
complexity of the regulatory regime therefore also shows the complexity of the 
compromises that seemed necessary to prevent conflict escalation. 
 At the base of this approach lies a particular strategy for dealing with chemical 
hazards. This strategy is utilitarian at heart, as has been argued poignantly by philosopher 
and activist Anne Chapman (Chapman, 2007; Halffman, 2009, forthcoming). The 
utilitarian logic states that the free enterprise of actors will lead to a collective good, 
provided that unwanted consequences (‘externalities’) are contained, typically through 
rules. In other words: the basic premise for chemical regulatory regimes is that chemical 
producers are free to pursue their commercial activity, provided these activities to not 
cause unacceptable harm, as far as specified in general rules that are policed, ultimately, 
by the state. The rules have to be general, as they have to create a ‘level playing field’ for 
all players, that is: equal competitive conditions in an international chemical market. The 
question of which harms are unacceptable and should be caught in general rules, has 
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dominated the EU debate over chemical regulation, for example on the issue of whether 
mere persistence (rather than toxicity) constitutes a harm. 
 The growing complexity of regulatory regimes is a problem in itself. First, the 
complexity of regulation can create a distorted playing field, where only companies 
capable of maintaining a large staff of regulatory specialists can participate. Rather than 
to create a free market, complexity can become a means to corner the market and avoid 
competition. For these reasons, the largest players in a market with complex regulation 
may even support increasing regulation, as it allows them to take control. The objection is 
a recurrent one, as smaller firms are concerned about the ability to compete, or small 
innovators, such as in the ecological pesticides sector, fear they will not be able to pass 
the regulatory post. Regulations that claim to create a level playing field can thus become 
self-defeating. 
Growing complexity also implies a threat of growing regulatory cost, especially 
as complex regulation may make it hard to assess regulatory overheads beforehand. The 
objection that has recently also been raised against REACH, not only in terms of 
financial cost, but also test animal lives (Hartung & Rovida, 2009), but is one that has 
been made since the birth of regulatory regimes, usually from the side of industry. In the 
markets for pesticides, but also pharmaceuticals, it is often claimed that high regulatory 
costs stifle innovation or reduce profitability. From a public perspective also, growing 
complexity raises collective costs, through the need to maintain regulatory agencies, 
monitoring, and enforcement. 
To a certain extent, such objections have been met: with exceptions for small 
volume chemicals to allow innovation, public regulatory costs being reclaimed through 
registration fees, with support for innovation through public research funds, or with 
attempts to harmonise chemical regulation internationally, such as through the creation of 
a European regulatory agency, rather than to rely on many national ones. However, such 
solutions have also created additional complexities, exacerbating rather than solving 
some of these problems. 
 The growing complexity of chemical regulation also constitutes a problem for the 
democratic order. The claim that the fairness of regulatory policies is guaranteed by a 
public, transparent process becomes more and more unreal as this process itself is so 
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complex that only a small group of experts can really understand the intricacies of the 
regulatory filigree. Even fifteen years ago, experts in regulatory agencies were already 
worried that they were outmatched by the intricate knowledge of regulatory procedure of 
industry experts. Citizens are therefore increasingly dependent on third parties and their 
experts in order to assure them that just decisions are being made. At the same time, 
inexplicable regulatory issues become less and less appealing to the public spaces where 
citizens discuss the collective good: how many journalists would dare tackle a regulatory 
decision under REACH for the evening news? 
 Regulatory complexity also reduces the possibility for effective policy 
intervention. Complex rules create new loopholes, new possibilities for delay, exception, 
exemption, objection, appeal. In this respect, chemical regulatory policy has an appalling 
track record. Effective regulatory action on a chemical of major significance typically 
takes several decades between early warning and effective policy action, see DDT, PCBs, 
dioxins, asbestos, phtalates, or anti-fouling paints.  It is quite disconcerting that it does 
not seem to matter much whether a refined regulatory apparatus is in place or not. Most 
major cases eventually require ad-hoc policy intervention anyway, with specific 
compromises and measures, specific regulations, and large amounts of non-standard 
research into unanticipated chemical effects through unforeseen pathways. A cold-
hearted look at the history of chemical regulation has to ask why such a complex 
regulatory apparatus has lead to so few effective regulatory actions, especially with 
respect to chemicals already in use. 
 Lastly, complexity itself can become a source of hazards, as Charles Perrow has 
showed for complex technological systems (Perrow, 1999). Where complexity 
undermines overview and an ability to see how rules affect the concrete life of the 
regulated subject, regulation can become its own worst enemy, creating a false sense of 
security. There are also political risks in complexity. Contradicting rules may undermine 
effective regulatory action, while the resulting absurd regulatory effects are easy pickings 
for populist anti-regulatory rhetoric that may delegitimize risk policy as a whole. (Health 
and safety regulations are notorious for unintended contradictions in regulatory 
requirements; e.g. the floor that has to be both smooth for hygiene and rough so as not to 
be slippery). In the US, the populist use of regulatory costs and unintended regulatory 
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consequences have contributed to undermine effective regulatory innovation for the last 
decade (e.g. the unfavourable comparison of the US Toxic Substance Control Act and the 
REACH programme in chapter @@). Thus, as one example of the possible political risk 
of complex regulations, regulatory complexity risks creating the conditions for a 
regulatory backlash. 
 Regulatory complexity is likely to increase further. One of the major gaping holes 
in chemical risk assessment is substance interaction. We still largely assess hazards of 
chemicals one by one, ignoring the fact that, for example, toxic chemicals are added to a 
world where a lot of toxic chemicals circulate already. We thereby ignore additive 
effects, let alone mutually reinforcing effects. There are a few exceptions, such as 
greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, methane, or nitrous oxide. We have learnt to 
express greenhouse gas effects in terms of their warming effect. That is: we assess risk 
from the perspective of the receptor, in this case the atmosphere. Environmentalists have 
long argued that something similar should be done for chemicals and concerns have been 
raised about cumulative neurotoxic effects of organophosphates. Experts have already 
recommended to look at toxic equivalents in food (Committee on toxicity of chemicals in 
food, 2002; Gezondheidsraad, 2002; Health Council of the Netherlands, 2004). Similarly, 
in the past, we have had to group organochlorine pesticides because of similar effects, 
doxins, or man-made fibres. Even if we were to identify a handful of key receptors in the 
human body, a handful in the physical environment, and a handful in the biological 
environment, the re-assessment of all chemicals from the perspective of these receptors 
would present an almost impossible task. 
 Complexity in chemical regulation is also likely to increase because the forces 
that drive it are still there. Experts continue to research new pathways, continue to 
develop new tests, or further refine exposure models. The main purpose of maintaining a 
competitive internal chemical market requires general rules, rather than case-by-case 
judgement. Every compromise over assessment procedures is embedded in new 
protocols. Furthermore, societal, including industry interests, are bound to further drive 
the complexity of regulation as each new controversy tends to add new rules to existing 
ones. 
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 It would be wrong to see our argument as a pro-industry plea for deregulation. 
First, because regulatory simplification is not necessarily pro-industry. In fact, the most 
radical de-regulation proposal on chemicals was made in circles of Greenpeace, 
suggesting that perhaps we have enough chemicals already and we should consider a ban 
on new chemicals. Second, de-regulation would be meaningless as long as there is no 
significant alternative to deal with the hazards created by the growing human circulation 
of chemicals through the world, man-made or not. 
 The growing complexity of regulation may be presented as an increasing 
correspondence between the complexity of the world and the complexity of assessment 
protocols, but we would argue that there is a limit to this development. 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this reflection on the developments of and in chemicals regulation in Europe since we 
wrote our scenarios more than 10 years ago, we have argued that the course of the 
developments has by and large followed the International Experts scenario that we then 
sketched. The separation between risk assessment and risk management has hardened in 
this period and the regulation of chemicals has increasingly become an international, 
European, rather than a local affair. We have also argued that some of the key tensions 
that we then saw resulting from this scenario are still present. Framing issues remain 
contentious and the increasing complexity of regulation proves to be transparent only for 
a few experts, thus threatening the democratic character of chemicals regulation. Whether 
this will result in a backlash in the future remains to be seen, but the conditions for this 
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